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Sustainability entrepreneurship in marine protected areas 
 
Simon R. Bush, Mariska Bottema, Jan Joris Midavaine and Eleanor Carter 
Abstract 
So called ‘entrepreneurial marine protected areas’ are one way in which private actors are 
setting and enforcing control over spatially contiguous marine habitats. These entrepreneurs 
fulfil both environmental and social outcomes, providing a sustainable source of funding for 
conservation and restoration activities, as well as interacting with communities dependent on 
these resources. In doing so they contribute to the conservation of public resources. But unlike 
state-led management, the success of these entrepreneurs is dependent on market forces, 
giving them access to sources of revenue traditionally limited to private sector enterprises, 
whilst concurrently incurring risks from market fluctuations that potentially threaten their 
durability in the long term. Through three case studies from Indonesia, Belize and Tanzania 
this chapter explores the ways in which these actors exploit opportunities to create innovative 
spatially delimited private governance arrangements around marine resources, and the extent 
to which the state has facilitated or hindered their activities. In doing so we discuss the 
potential of these private actors for establishing the necessary authority for long-term 
conservation. 
Introduction 
The involvement of private actors in marine conservation has steadily increased in recent 
decades as the need for sustainable funding models has become apparent (Dixon et al., 1993; 
Colwell, 1998; Balmford et al., 2004; Christie and White, 2007). In these so-called 
‘entrepreneurial marine protected areas’ (EMPAs) (Colwell, 1997), private-actors seek 
business opportunities that fund a combination of conservation activities and local livelihood 
(Colwell, 1998; de Groot and Bush, 2010; Bottema and Bush, 2012). Building on the 
emerging perspective of Shepherd and Patzelt (2011), these EMPAs appear to characterise the 
role of entrepreneurial action as a catalyst for sustaining or protecting ecosystems by 
“providing economic and non-economic gains for investors, entrepreneurs and societies” (p. 
138).  
The type of entrepreneurial intervention in EMPAs ranges from collecting diver fees that 
directly fund park management (Dixon et al., 1993; Tongson and Dygico, 2004; de Groot and 
Bush, 2010), to designing and implementing co-management arrangements in state designated 
parks (Teh et al., 2008), and to private tenure over spatially delimited marine habitat 
(Svensson et al., 2010). While the specific drivers for private sector involvement differ per 
case, one constant challenge they face is maintaining a requisite level of legitimacy and 
authority to practice conservation. We argue (based on earlier work, see Bottema and Bush, 
2012) that the long-term ‘durability’ of their entrepreneurial activity, including the institutions 
they establish around the EMPAs, is dependent on continued support of both states actors and 
local communities. 
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Based on our earlier work in three EMPAs in South-East Asia, Central America and Africa 
(see Figure 1), this chapter explores how diverse entrepreneurial approaches have identified 
and exploited opportunities for spatially delimited, or ‘territorial’, private conservation of 
marine resources. In doing so we provide a meta-analysis of the cases to identify a 
generalizable set of conditions under which sustainability entrepreneurs are able to identify 
and exploit opportunities for generating individual and communal benefits, as well as 
consolidate their activities into long-term conservation activities. 
The following section provides an overview of entrepreneurialism and marine conservation 
where we outline key conditions for exploitation, consolidation and durability of 
conservation-related entrepreneurial activity.  We then detail three diverse case studies of 
EMPAs in Indonesia, Belize and Tanzania using a mix of primary and secondary data (recent 
studies by the authors include Bottema and Bush, 2012; Nordlund et al., 2013; Midavaine, 
2014). Based on this cross-case comparison we then discuss the challenges of entrepreneurs to 
maintain private authority for long-term conservation. 
 
 
Figure 1. Map of three case studies and all other recorded EMPAs. 
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Marine sustainability entrepreneurialism 
The emergence of EMPAs 
Reflecting the slow progress made towards a establishing a global network of MPAs, the 
Convention on Biodiversity recently shifted its ambition of 10% coverage of the world’s 
oceans from 2012 to 2020 (see Rife et al., 2013). The effectiveness of established parks have 
been questioned; with many labelled as ‘paper parks’. At local scales demands for coastal 
resources often exceed the capacity of those habitats to maintain a requisite level of 
biodiversity (Selig and Bruno, 2010). As variously argued (e.g. Mascia et al., 2010; Selig and 
Bruno, 2010; Chuenpagdee et al., 2013), meeting the national and global demands for MPA 
establishment remains firmly linked to the local contexts within which conservation activities 
are embedded.  
Although a more recent phenomenon than terrestrial-based private-led conservation (Norton, 
2000), the role and scope of EMPAs has increased and diversified since being first 
introduced. Colwell’s (1997) initial description involved networks of small-scale protected 
areas managed by partnerships between local communities and private operators which “have 
a vested economic interest in promoting abundant marine life’’ (p.110).  He indicated that 
these discrete pockets of protected habitat can be developed within or in combination with 
state-led MPAs. Private-sector involvement is therefore seen as: (1) A short-term intervention 
that can stimulate the development of state-led protected areas by raising local awareness and 
building local capacity (Colwell, 1998);  (2) A way of providing alternative sources of income 
to local communities, thereby reducing extractive pressure on marine resources  (Dixon et al., 
1993; Christie and White, 2007); and/or (3) a long-term means of establishing economic 
activities around marine conservation that can provide a durable source of funding (Bottema 
and Bush, 2012). 
The small number of studies of EMPA-like conservation initiatives have analysed the role of 
hotels in establishing no-take areas (e.g. Svensson et al., 2009), dive shop operated reef 
conservation (e.g. de Groot and Bush, 2010), public-private partnerships (e.g.Teh et al., 2008) 
and user fee systems (e.g. Dixon et al., 1993; Tongson and Dygico, 2004; Uyarra et al., 2010). 
While the majority of these studies have focused on ecological issues, co-management and the 
economics of private intervention, there is a dearth of sociological analysis on the role 
entrepreneurs play in marine conservation. 
Entrepreneurial exploitation, consolidation and durability 
Applied to sustainability, entrepreneurship refers to a process through which individuals 
discover and exploit individual business opportunities that are oriented towards changing the 
consumption or management of natural and/or communal environment, which in turn 
provides development gains for others (Patzelt and Shepherd, 2011; Schaltegger and Wagner, 
2011). Here we propose a framework to evaluate the dynamic process of entrepreneurial 
interventions in territorial based conservation such as EMPAs (see Figure 2) by dividing 
sustainability entrepreneurialism into three analytical phases – exploitation, consolidation and 
durability. 
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Figure 2. Dynamic framework for understanding the development of area based 
entrepreneurial conservation. 
 
The exploitation of any opportunity for sustainability entrepreneurship begins with a 
‘problem’ defined by any combination of environmental and social factors. For example, a 
problem related to environmental issues might be characterised by a decline in an ecological 
dimension such as biodiversity, or an increase in material flows such as effluent. However, 
underlying these declines or inputs are often institutional or market failures; such that 
environmental problems result from weak regulation or adverse allocation of resources 
(Cohen and Winn, 2007). Whether an entrepreneur responds to these problems is dependent 
on the extent to which they can identify and exploit an opportunity to create new approaches 
for reaching a sustainability goal. Following Eckhardt and Shane (2003), these opportunities 
are often related to the introduction of new goods, services or markets or organisational 
methods as means to the ends of improved sustainability. By examining the emergence of 
EMPAs, we compare the conditions that enable entrepreneurs to exploit conservation 
opportunities. 
Once established, the consolidation of a conservation based entrepreneurial activity also 
depends on the extent to which it can be institutionally embedded. Consolidation in this sense 
refers to the type of institutional arrangement, including the degree of support received from 
the state or communities, for creating varying degrees of exclusion to habitat or biological 
resources within that habitat (Pacheco et al., 2010; Bennett and Dearden, 2014). The extent of 
exclusion may vary from full enclosure of a habitat with state support, to partial or seasonal 
exclusion established through usufruct rights. Formal recognition from the state, in customary 
tenure arrangements and/or in co-management arrangements all contribute to the legitimacy 
of entrepreneurial activity and therefore the degree to which entrepreneurs can establish 
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conservation rights (e.g. Lambooy and Levashova, 2011; Lamers et al., 2014). In addition, 
entrepreneurial activity can be further consolidated if an entrepreneur receives international 
recognition and support, ranging from intergovernmental funding or status to professional 
accreditation (e.g. through scuba diving associations). 
Finally, durability refers to the conditions that allow sustainability entrepreneurs to persist in 
a given social and institutional setting, and their capacity to create and shape change towards 
environmental conservation (Busenitz et al., 2003). Given its relational nature the private 
authority of entrepreneurs is largely determined by their capacity to set new norms and 
practices for environmental conservation, which is in turn bound to their ability to (re)produce 
the trust of other societal and state actors (Partzsch and Ziegler, 2011; Green, 2013). Direct 
state support through legal assurance of an entrepreneurs status, and conversely legal 
compliance, is the most direct and durable means of establishing and maintaining trust in their 
activities. However, without a clear legal status entrepreneurial activities can also be 
supported through either explicit or tacit community support (Smith and McElwee, 2013). 
Entrepreneurs may be able to gain political support for their activities, allowing them to 
persist with activities even if their legal status remains ambiguous. 
In the rest of this chapter we apply the above framework to the experiences of three EMPAs 
embedded in different natural, social and political settings. In doing so we identify the 
conditions under which private actors are able to identify, exploit and exercise sustainability 
entrepreneurship. 
Comparative experiences with EMPAs 
Chumbe Island Coral Park, Tanzania 
Chumbe is a 22 hectare coral island located 12 km off the southwest coast of Zanzibar in 
Tanzania. In 1990 an expatriate consultant worked on the Zanzibar Integrated Land and 
Environmental Management Project which proposed immediate action on environmental 
education for communities who depended on marine resources and for staff of the Department 
of Environment (Rojas-Laserna, 2011). However, government support for both marine 
protection and environmental education in Zanzibar was limited. Instead, responding to the 
release of state coastal leases for tourism development, the entrepreneur saw an opportunity to 
exploit a link between education and conservation through a self-funded eco-lodge. The result 
was Chumbe Island Coral Park Ltd. (CHICOP), gazetted by the Government of Zanzibar in 
1994 as the first private-led MPA established in Tanzania. 
The consolidation of CHICOP took place over a number of years and required ongoing high 
level political support (Nordlund et al., 2013). Although the opportunity came partly from 
government policy aimed at promoting tourism development on Zanzibar, the proposal to 
establish a privately run MPA initially faced resistance from local fishers and some local 
government officials. In response the entrepreneur approached the Prime Minister’s office on 
the importance of education and conservation, and successfully gained support for the lease 
(Rojas-Laserna, 2011). This support was further strengthened when the park was listed as a 
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gazetted park and again when the classified as a Category II protected area by the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (Nordlund et al., 2013). 
Despite growing recognition of the EMPA, private tenure over the island and protection of the 
surrounding waters remains vulnerable given that leases issued under the 1986 Investment 
Protection Act can be revoked by the State “with relative ease” (Riedmiller, 2003). 
Difficulties in re-negotiating leases for the island and adjacent marine area, every thirty three 
and ten years respectively, reflects this challenge (Riedmiller and Carter, 2001b). As private 
tenure of public resources has been questioned CHICOP has stressed the link between 
effective protection of marine resources as a condition for the growth and sustainability of 
quality tourism (Rojas-Laserna, 2011). CHICOP has also actively developed a range of local 
and national social and political relations, with the express intent of further strengthening long 
term tenure over the EMPA. 
A range of strategies have been adopted to strengthen the relations which grant CHICOP the 
ongoing legitimacy and authority to operate (see Riedmiller and Carter, 2001a; Riedmiller, 
2003; Nordlund et al., 2013). An advisory committee including nine representatives from 
adjacent villages, research and government departments is held twice a year. In addition, 
CHICOP releases regular activity reports and a biannual newsletter. Institutional links are also 
made to local and foreign research institutes. Relations with surrounding communities have 
also been strengthened through regular consultation meetings, fisher association support 
(including provision of an in-water rescue service for fishers in distress) and the proactive 
employment of local community members in the project. Building on the education goals of 
the entrepreneur, the program funds and manages visits from schools throughout Zanzibar, 
has established school environment clubs, and fisher associations. Finally, a historic 
lighthouse functions as an important maritime navigation system, managed by CHICOP staff 
in co-operation with the Harbour Authority.  
The wider legitimacy of CHICOP was also consolidated through investment in the 
environmental credentials of the park - including the development of eco-touristic activities, 
the use of eco-architecture and eco-technologies in lodge design and construction. The park 
has also received considerable international recognition as an exceptional example of private 
sector led marine conservation by the Nature Conservancy and the European Union, and has 
received awards from groups including the United Nations and National Geographic.  
Despite its success there remain a series of threats to the ongoing durability of CHICOP. The 
entrepreneur herself argues that the long terms prospect of the EMPA depends on the ongoing 
willingness of the government to extend the management agreements (Reidmiller, 2008). 
CHICOP has no legal assurance that a renewal of their leases will occur, and they are also 
made vulnerable by the Zanzibar Investment Act of 1986 which affords no protection against 
expropriation by the government (Nordlund et al., 2013). Management agreements and tenure 
arrangements are held through two key lease agreements: A Closed Forest Reserve 
Agreement (33 years renewable, currently valid to 2027), and a Reef Sanctuary Agreement 
(10 years renewable, currently valid to 2024). While the relations established with 
government and the local community puts CHICOP in a strong position to renew the leases, a 
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change in government or political will leave the future of the EMPA open to a new round of 
discussion. 
Pemuteran, Indonesia 
Pemuteran is a small fishing village in the North West of Bali, Indonesia’s most popular 
island tourism destination. Pemuteran’s tourism industry developed in the early 1990s 
(Piskurek, 2001; Goreau et al., 2008). Illegal dynamite and cyanide fishing methods were still 
being employed by local fishermen. Recognizing the resulting reef degradation, two 
entrepreneurs, a Balinese hotelier and an expat who established Pemuteran’s first dive shop, 
began communicating to fishermen about the consequences of their activities. Recognising 
both a problem and opportunity to exploit for entrepreneurial activity, the expat incorporated 
coral repair into dives he offered his clients. Influenced by the awareness raised by the 
entrepreneurs, in 1995 the village community declared a local ban on illegal fishing methods, 
appointed beach guards to enforce this, and declared a No Take Zone (NTZ) of 1ha for which 
an entry fee was charged to tourists.  
In 1998 the Asian economic crisis resulted in many displaced Indonesian workers turning to 
fishing, bringing illegal fishing practices back to Pemuteran. Recognising the need to 
conserve coral suffering from both bleaching and overfishing a Balinese entrepreneur decided 
to invest in Biorock, a coral restoration technology developed by the Global Coral Reef 
Alliance (GCRA) (Goreau et al., 2008). In 2000 numerous hotels invested in Biorock coral 
nurseries, involving the local community in their construction. Management and maintenance 
of these nurseries was consolidated under the NGO Yayasan Karang Lestari. The community 
subsequently appointed a traditional community-based security unit to reinforce the national 
ban on destructive fishing practices and to protect the newly established NTZ where the coral 
nurseries were located. Fishermen were said to not be sufficiently included in the decision-
making process leading to creation of this NTZ, so this development initially faced more 
resistance than the previously appointed NTZ. Eventually however, the fishermen came to 
accept this new protected area. 
Marine conservation institutions in Pemuteran are in place largely due to efforts of a few 
independently acting entrepreneurs. The consolidation of the EMPA comprises several 
informal institutions which work toward common goals, but appear to operate individually. 
The dive sector is also not formally organized, without  structural communication and no 
formalized price agreement. However, the dive shops cater to different niches. It appears that 
competitive behavior, which can lead to overuse and degradation of reefs (e.g. Roman et al., 
2007), has thus been avoided. 
The private sector gained legitimacy through financial and non-financial investments in the 
local community. Some dive shops pay fishermen for using their area, some supply the 
fishermen with fish aggregating devices. The private sector has also invested in cultural assets 
and activities such as funding restoration of temples, which has been important for building 
support amongst the local community. Gaining support of the village’s religious leaders and 
employing locals has been beneficial in exercising social control over the community in terms 
of resource use. It can be argued that Biorock technology has also played a role in 
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legitimating entrepreneurial conservation activities. Its presence produces tangible proof of 
private sector investments in conservation, provides local employment and educates local 
inhabitants and tourists about the need for marine conservation. 
The reefs have largely remained common property as there has only been minimal enclosure 
of areas. As a result the private sector has been able to exercise marine conservation without 
marginalizing original resource users. However, norms and rules established by the private 
sector have not been formalized into government regulation, or into du jure rights over these 
areas. Pemuteran is designated as a Daerah Parawisata Laut (Sea Tourism Area) by provincial 
law; regency law states that the area has to exercise a conservation effort but does not state 
specifically how. In Pemuteran’s village decree it is stated that the area designated for tourism 
can only be used for tourism, which indirectly supports designation of the NTZ, but grants the 
area no official protected area status. The private sector has formed two informal semi-
voluntary agreements with fishermen in cooperation with the village: a local agreement to 
enforce a national ban on destructive fishing practices and the creation of a de facto NTZ. The 
collapse of the previous equally informal agreements in 1998 due to effects of the economic 
crisis leads one to question the long-term durability of this EMPA as it currently stands.  
The private sector’s relations with the original resource owners - Pemuteran village and 
fisherman - appear to be based on mutual cooperation largely due to initial efforts of the two 
initial individual entrepreneurs to build trust. These two entrepreneurs remain key individuals 
for management of the EMPA due to their leadership function and their connecting role in 
relations with local stakeholder groups. This brings with it a risk of overdependence and 
consequently leads one to question the EMPAs long-term durability even further. 
Laughing Bird Caye, Belize 
Since the 1980s, Placencia has grown to become one of the fastest growing tourism 
destinations in Belize. Tourism activity began with tours to the surrounding cayes (islands) by 
local fishermen. Most tourists were brought to Laughing Bird Caye (LBC), a long and narrow 
island of 0.57 ha 11 miles of the coast of Placencia. In 1990 fishermen and pioneering tour 
guides found out LBC was being surveyed to be sold and developed. Recognising the impact 
that this development would have to tourism and fishing in the area, a resident expat owner of 
a local hotel, fishermen and other concerned community members established the Friends of 
Laughing Bird Caye Committee. The Committee was an means for the entrepreneur to engage 
and exploit an opportunity for tourism and conservation. With a successful petition among the 
inhabitants of Placencia the Committee established a voluntary ban on fishing in the 
surrounding waters and camping on the caye. Significant lobbying further resulted in 
protection of LBC as a national park under the 1981 National Park System Act of the Forest 
Department in 1991 (Wildtracks, 2010). National parks (NP) in Belize are strictly non-
extractive reserves “for the protection and preservation of natural and scenic values of 
national significance for the benefit and enjoyment of the general public” (Government of 
Belize, 2000, p. 6).  
At the national level an integrated coastal zone management approach for the protection of 
Belize’s reefs was envisioned. A Coastal Zone Management Unit was established under the 
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Fisheries Department in 1990 and followed up with the UNDP/GEF funded Coastal Zone 
Management Project in 1993. The Committee received funding from this project to develop a 
management plan for LBCNP.  
In 1996 the national park was expanded as part of the Belize Barrier Reef Reserve System, a 
collective UNESCO World Heritage Site. As a result the entire Laughing Bird Caye Faro, an 
elongated ridge of reef covering approximately 12 square nautical miles was consolidated by 
gaining a formal national legal status (Vellos, 2003). This development was welcomed by the 
inhabitants of Placencia undergoing a transition toward becoming more tourism oriented. 
Despite the involvement of the Forest Department, there was insufficient capacity from the 
government and the Committee to adequately deal with day-to-day management. Instead 
responsibility was given to the newly formed NGO Friends of Laughing Bird Caye, which 
took on the development of the management plan, as well as ongoing monitoring and 
enforcement. The management of the EMPA was further consolidated with an agreement 
signed with the Forest Department in 2001, receiving de jure rights and official recognition as 
a co-manager of LBCNP. Soon after external funds from UNDP, GEF, World Wide Fund for 
Nature (WWF) and The Nature Conservancy (TNC) allowed those business owners originally 
involved in the Committee to step aside and be replaced by a professional reserve manager 
and ranger who were made special constables of the state police force (Vellos, 2003).  
The durability of the MPA has been facilitated by the co-management arrangement, given that 
the private sector has been able to maintain an active role in the management and maintenance 
of the MPA as a tourism destination. This caused the NGO, now known as the Southern 
Environmental Association, to function as a platform to negotiate the link between tourism 
and conservation. It allowed the private sector to maintain influence and build facilities like 
pick-nick tables and a barbeque, though restricted to develop exclusive rights. Similar to the 
Pemuteran case, the no-take status of LBCNP appeared to provide a suitable investment 
environment for a coral restoration initiative. This initiative, known as Fragments of Hope, is 
run by a resident expat marine biologist and is funded by among others WWF and the World 
Bank (Bowden-Kerby and Carne, 2012). 
Historically co-management appeared to be a successful concept to solve government 
departments lack of capacity and channel funding from international conservation 
organizations (Young and Horwich, 2007). However, with over 94 protected areas 
(Government of Belize, 2005), accounting for 36% of Belize’s national territory in 2005, 
legislation, mandates, roles and responsibilities started to get unclear (Meerman, 2005). In 
response to this, policies were revised and (re-)formulated leading to the establishment of the 
National Protected Areas System Plan (NPASP) in 2005, demanding co-management 
organizations to sign a new co-management agreement in November 2012. Signing the 
agreement increases state control and limits NGO autonomy, and in particular risks alteration 
of arrangements made between co-management organizations and the private sector. Refusing 
to sign, makes activities carried out by co-management organizations illegal. With some 
exceptions most co-management organizations still refused to sign by 2013.  
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Discussion 
The three cases present diverse but comparable experiences on how entrepreneurs establish 
and consolidate EMPAs based on exploitation, consolidation and durability. In summary we 
see that: 1. Entrepreneurs exploit business opportunities that are wholly dependent on 
conservation outcomes; 2. They consolidate institutional arrangements by gaining recognition 
by states and/or local communities; and 3. The long-term durability of EMPAs is dependent 
on maintaining social relations with civil society groups, state actors and local communities. 
Seen as such EMPAs do not fill short-term ‘gaps’, but can provide long-term strategies that 
states might be able to coordinate for wider communal returns. Based on these observations 
and linking the work of Lambooy and Levashova (2011) and Lamers et al. (2014), we now 
compare the three cases (see Table 1) and discuss the conditions required for entrepreneurs to 
establish the legitimacy and ultimately authority necessary to persist with the conservation of 
public resources over the long-term. 
Overall, the three cases show strong variation in how entrepreneurs identified and exploited 
opportunities to develop their EMPA. But common to all cases, entrepreneurial exploitation 
of conservation opportunities require changes in politics, policy and/or regulation for 
redistributing value to support improved (privately-led) environmental stewardship (following 
Shepherd and Patzelt, 2011). While in Pemuteran there was a clear link between reef 
degradation and restoration, the problems identified in the other two cases were in response to 
perceived ‘institutional failures’ (Dean and McMullen, 2007). In Chumbe, there was a lack of 
awareness around marine protected areas and in Laughing Bird Caye the entrepreneurial 
action was a form of resistance against externally driven uncontrolled tourism development. 
By exploiting opportunities to establish territorial control over these areas, entrepreneurs were 
able to generate individual and communal benefits. However, the cases also demonstrate that 
the overall effectiveness of these territorial approaches to conservation required substantial 
efforts to create and consolidate their position with both the state and local communities. 
The approach and extent to which entrepreneurs can establish EMPAs that receive state 
and/or international support, differ substantially. Both CHICOP and Laughing Bird Caye have  
received recognition from national government by establishing entrepreneur-led co-
management arrangements (cf. von Heland et al., 2014). In the case of CHICOP this was done 
by inviting government and local community representatives to join its advisory committee . 
Reflecting a multi-level strategy for sustainable entrepreneurialism (Dyerson and Preuss, 
2012), CHICOP has also consolidated political support by receiving formal listing as a 
national MPA in addition to international level recognition from IUCN. Similarly, in 
Laughing Bird Caye legitimacy has been established with both the community and 
government through a formally recognized co-management agreement with the forest 
department. In contrast, the case of Pemuteran demonstrates that in the absence of national 
recognition, informal agreements with the local community and only limited international 
support can also enable entrepreneurs to consolidate their conservation activities. However, 
the consequence appears to be less rigid territorial control, which may benefit communities, 
but also result in trade-offs in terms of conservation. 
 Table 1. Comparison of exploitation, consolidation and durability of three entrepreneurial marine protected areas 
Conditions Chumbe Island, Tanzania Permuteran, Bali, Indonesia Laughing Bird Caye, Belize 
Exploitation 
Problem  
identification 
• Lack of environmental 
education and Lack of 
marine conservation 
areas 
• Reef degradation 
through illegal fishing 
methods and coral 
bleaching events 
• Coordinated opposition 
to privatization  
Opportunity 
identification 
• Opportunity for 
establishment of marine 
conservation area to 
support education, self-
financed through resort 
development established 
through tourism and 
investment legislation 
• Opportunity to re-
establish ‘no take area’ 
around Biorock 
structures for dive 
tourism 
• Opportunity for 
establishing no take area 
and dive operation on 
the coast of Placencia 
Consolidation 
Institutional 
embedding 
• Formal lease; Advisory 
committee with input 
from communities and 
state 
• Minimal enclosure 
leading to ongoing 
cooperation with local 
communities 
• Co-management 
arrangement established 
with the forest 
department 
Formal 
status 
• Gazetted as nationally 
listed Marine Protected 
Area 
• Designated by 
provincial law as Daerah 
Parawisata Laut (Sea 
Tourism Area). Village 
• Gazetted as national 
park  
• Part of Belize MPA 
network 
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decree states areas 
which can only be used 
for tourism purposes 
International 
recognition 
• International funding 
and awards 
• IUCN listed protected 
area 
• Known a largest 
Biorock reef 
• International funding 
• One of seven MPAs of 
Belize Barrier Reef 
World Heritage Site  
Durability 
Legal 
assurance 
• No legal assurance of 
lease renewal  
• No legal assurance of 
access and investment 
• Weak assurance; 
national level 
renegotiation of co-
management agreements 
Community 
support 
• Medium to high 
community support 
• Variable community 
support 
• Strong community 
support 
Political 
support 
• Renewal of lease 
vulnerable to national 
and local political 
change 
• Recognition through 
visits of various 
government officials 
• The MPA and its 
management should 
comply with guidelines 
prescribed in the 
National Protected 
Areas Policy and 
System Plan.  
 
Finally, these findings also point to how the durability of ‘entrepreneurial authority’ (Green 
2013) takes shape and is challenged. All three cases demonstrate that the long-term durability 
of entrepreneurial activity to overcome implementation and enforcement failures is dependent 
on their perceived legitimacy by both the state, who grant formal tenure, and the communities 
who grant usufruct rights over habitats and biological resources. As the cases show, where 
state support is highly institutionalized, the durability of the EMPAs is subject to changes in 
national level support for private marine tenure; CHICOP’s lease remains vulnerable to 
political change and Laughing Bird Caye is vulnerable to a turn to more centralized state 
control after a long period of devolved conservation. While the theme of private authority is 
taken up in international environmental governance (e.g. Pattberg 2007; Green 2013), more 
research is needed in the context of sustainable entrepreneurship – especially around 
territorial forms of conservation. 
How effective these EMPAs are as territorial conservation approaches in the long-term also 
appears to be dependent on the timing and source of entrepreneurial action. In both Pemuteran 
and Chumbe relations with communities are characterised by ongoing friction over the 
usufruct rights they have granted to the entrepreneurs. In both cases the impetus for creating 
an EMPA was to change endogenous negative impacts of local fishing practices by limiting 
access to habitat and resources in return for alternative income streams and (potential) 
increases in fish yields from effectively managed exclusion areas. In contrast, Laughing Bird 
Caye was developed in response to the exogenous threat of dredging and only subsequently 
led to the exclusion of fishers; a process which the fishers themselves initiated. In this case the 
legitimacy of a conservation intervention was established prior to the entrepreneurs 
establishing authority over this intervention. In the other cases there was no agreed basis from 
which the entrepreneurial intervention could draw their legitimacy. As reflected in other 
resource sectors (e.g. Gritten and Saastamoinen, 2010; Gedajlovic et al., 2013), gaining 
acceptability and support and ultimately legitimacy through the relations entrepreneurs build 
with different actors especially is even more essential when there is a degree of resource 
enclosure. 
Overall, the results support claims that in conserving common or open access resources 
entrepreneurial activity relies on changing access and use rights and establishing new industry 
norms to shape the behavior of resource users (Dean and McMullen, 2007; Pacheco et al., 
2010). The long-term success of a sustainability entrepreneur in such area-based arrangements 
is therefore not only related to their capacity to identify and exploit opportunities, but also the 
extent to which they can consolidate their activities and create durable long-term institutional 
change. Such observations extend the literature on sustainability entrepreneurialism by 
opening up the challenges of territorially based entrepreneurial activity and making links to 
other studies of locally embedded private conservation (Rosen and Olsson, 2013; Van Wijk et 
al., 2015). Building on Green (2013), these observations also point to the need for further 
research on the under-explored notion of entrepreneurial authority, and in doing so offer an 
opportunity to extend the literature on sustainable entrepreneurialism.  
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Conclusion 
The future of sustainability entrepreneurship in the establishment of MPAs is dependent on 
not only the capacity of entrepreneurs to seek and exploit opportunities, but also on their 
capacity to consolidate private institutions over the long-term. The cases analyzed in this 
chapter demonstrate that the ‘durability’ of their entrepreneurial activity is dependent on the 
support they are able to gain and sustain from the state and local communities. 
Entrepreneurial activity in marine conservation, involving spatial demarcation of conservation 
activities, is therefore a highly relational and dynamic process of legitimating private 
authority. The more institutionalized an arrangement becomes the more secure the economic 
and environmental individual and communal payoffs may be, yet concurrently flexibility 
remains an essential component of entrepreneurialism and innovation. Balancing these 
juxtaposing elements are challenges all EMPAs face.  
Furthermore, the results show that private control over marine conservation is not independent 
of the state. On the contrary, state involvement is fundamental in providing the ‘action space’ 
for entrepreneurs to exploit and consolidate opportunities, while also ensuring they are able to 
contribute to the stewardship of public habitat and resources. Without a clear framework for 
state collaboration and support these private sustainability entrepreneurs are unlikely to be 
able to establish durable spatially delimited institutions around the conservation of marine 
resources over the long term. Nevertheless, the durability of these conservation areas also 
remains dependent on the flexibility and efficiency of entrepreneurial activity. Future research 
can further our understanding of how EMPAs can contribute to wider-scale marine and 
coastal planning either by connecting wider network of small conservation areas, or 
stimulating state marine protected areas that promote resilience through coastal linkages with 
EMPAs. However, in doing so, questions need to be asked about how both private and public 
interests can be flexibly and efficiently met. 
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